Supreme Court and Securities Class Actions
The Supreme Court's Impact on Securities Class Actions:
An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs
The Supreme Court is not all that interested in securities law; on average, it hears about one securities case per year.
1 The Court's inattention means that many areas of securities regulation are left to be developed by the lower courts and the SEC. In the field of securities class actions, that means mainly development by the district and appellate courts, with occasional amicus participation from the SEC. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has taken a more active role in the area, loading up its still small securities docket with securities class actions. The impetus for this attention no doubt arises from the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which gave rise to a host of interpretive questions.
In this paper, we assess the impact of the Supreme Court's recent securities decisions on the lower courts, where most of the action in securities fraud class actions occurs. In particular, we are interested in the effect of Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd ., 2 on lower court decisions. Tellabs interprets the PSLRA's "strong inference" standard for pleading scienter-the defendants' state of mind-in Rule 10b-5 cases; 3 the Supreme Court reversed a very lenient Seventh Circuit decision for drawing inferences with respect to scienter, but replaced it with a standard that is nonetheless relatively generous to plaintiffs.
Tellabs represents one of the Supreme Court's first opportunities to interpret the
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PSLRA. 4 More importantly, Tellabs addressed a question central to motion to dismiss practice in the lower courts. The PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event in securities fraud class actions, effectively making district courts gatekeepers charged with screening out meritless class actions at an early stage. The evidence on how effective district courts are at doing this task is mixed, 5 but there can be little doubt that Tellabs will influence lower court judges as they undertake this sorting process. The strong inference scienter provision interpreted in Tellabs is central to Congress's efforts to screen out meritless class actions in enacting the PSLRA, and appellate courts have split in determining the height of the barrier it has created for plaintiffs pleading fraud. 6 Thus, Tellabs has the potential to affect significantly motion to dismiss outcomes.
To assess this possibility, we collect a sample of securities class action complaints filed from 2003 until the date of the Tellabs decision in 2007, along with the decisions resolving motions to dismiss in those cases. We limit our sample to suits filed just prior to the Tellabs decision to avoid possible selection effects from Tellabs on suits filed after the decision, allowing us to observe directly the impact of Tellabs on motion to dismiss decisions. Although
we collect data from all circuits, we highlight in our analysis the Ninth Circuit, traditionally the leading venues for securities fraud class actions. The Ninth Circuit also has the most stringent standard for pleading scienter. We find that Tellabs correlates with a significantly lower dismissal rate in the Ninth Circuit. A lower rate of dismissals may improve on shareholder welfare if the suits that are not dismissed consist primarily of meritorious suits. However, we also find that suits that settled in the post-Tellabs period correspond with a higher incidence of nuisance settlements-suggesting that Tellabs undermined the anti-frivolous litigation objective of the PSLRA. We conclude that Tellabs was a significant victory for the plaintiffs' bar.
We proceed as follows. Part 1 describes the Tellabs decision and develops hypotheses relating to the effect of those decisions in the different circuits. Part 2 describes the sample and provides descriptive statistics. Part 3 presents the results of our empirical tests of our hypotheses. Part 4 concludes.
Background and Hypotheses
Tellabs addressed the key provision in the PSLRA for weeding out frivolous "stock price drop" lawsuits: the strong inference standard for scienter. That provision requires plaintiffs to "state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind." 7 The provision was modeled after the standard applied in the Second Circuit prior to the PSLRA, which was generally regarded as the most stringent at the time. 8 In 7 Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(2). 8 See S. Rep. No. 104-98, at 15 (1993 ), reprinted in 1995 adopting the strong inference provision, Congress specifically rejected the looser standard applied in the Ninth Circuit.
9
Prior to the PSLRA, the Second Circuit had held that plaintiffs could meet the scienter standard in one of two ways. First, plaintiffs could plead that the defendants had the motive to commit fraud and the opportunity to do so. 10 Although simplistic allegations of motive that could apply generally, such as keeping one's job, 11 were insufficient to meet the standard, other allegations of specific financial gain from a transaction were sufficient to state a claim.
12
Second, plaintiffs could meet the standard with circumstantial evidence of either recklessness or conscious behavior. 13 Generally, this standard required plaintiffs to plead contemporaneous facts, conditions, or statements to show that the defendants knew or should have known that the alleged misstatement was misleading when made.
14 After the PSLRA was enacted, the Second Circuit relied on the legislative history and held that the PSLRA codified its pre-PSLRA pleading approach. 15 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit 9 Consistent with the language of Rule 9(b), before the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit had developed a heightened pleading standard allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter generally, but demanding particularity in alleging all other elements of securities fraud. See In re Glenfed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9 th Cir. 1994). 10 Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985 . 11 See In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Conn. 1994) . 12 See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 , 1070 (2d Cir. 1985 (holding that allegations that defendants bullish statements to market were connected to significant stock sales met motive and opportunity test). 13 See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996) (requiring plaintiffs seeking to meet recklessness standard to provide higher level of detail than that required under motive and opportunity test). 14 See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124 , 1129 (2d. Cir. 1994 ) (rejecting allegations of fraud where plaintiffs failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous internal document or data). 15 Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2000) . The Second Circuit has, however, refined its explication of the standard post-PSLRA. Now, rather than a two-prong test, the Second Circuit has set forth a list of the general types of allegations that will meet the heightened pleading standard for scienter. Synthesizing its own case law on the pleading standard, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs can plead a strong inference of fraudulent intent by including sufficient allegations that the defendants: received concrete, personal benefits from the alleged fraud; participated in deliberately illegal behavior; knew or had access to facts "suggesting" that the public statements were inaccurate; or "failed to check information they had a duty to monitor." See id. at 311. This refined standard, of course, still leaves room for pleading based on motive and opportunity.
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recognized that the PSLRA repudiated that court's old standard, which did not require that state of mind be pleaded with specificity. In interpreting the "strong inference" provision, the Ninth Circuit also relied on the PSLRA's legislative history, but concluded that the statute raised the standard above that of the Second Circuit. 16 Under this higher pleading standard, the Ninth Circuit rejected allegations based on motive and opportunity and on recklessness. Instead, to meet the Ninth Circuit's new pleading standard for scienter, plaintiffs had to plead, "at a minimum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious recklessness."
17
Most circuits, however, took a middle course in interpreting the strong inference standard, concluding that motive and opportunity allegations might suffice to support a strong inference of scienter, but courts would need to evaluate such allegations on a "caseby-case" basis.
18
The choice of scienter standard has important consequences: the Ninth Circuit, in adopting the most stringent standard post-PSLRA, also substantially increased its dismissal rate.
In an earlier study, Pritchard and Sale found that Ninth Circuit courts dismissed cases at a 63% rate, while Second Circuit courts dismissed only 36%. 
H1C: Courts previously applying the reasonableness standard should be more likely to dismiss complaints based on scienter grounds post-Tellabs.
We are also interested in the consequences for defendants stemming from the relatively generous Tellabs equality standard. We predict that defendants will be less likely to get an early dismissal of weak complaints with prejudice. To state it differently, district courts applying the equality standard will be more likely to give plaintiffs an opportunity to amend defective complaints before final dismissal. We now turn to the effect of the Supreme Court's decision on monetary outcomes. The next proposition follows directly from the last two: if defendants find it more difficult to obtain a dismissal with prejudice, or if it takes longer to obtain that dismissal, they will be more willing to settle even weak cases in order to avoid the costs of litigation. 
H2A:

H3A: Defendants in Ninth Circuit
Sample and Descriptive Statistics
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we construct our sample by collecting complaints from Thus, all of the cases in our sample were filed pre-Tellabs, but many of the decisions resolving motions to dismiss those cases were handed down after Tellabs. The strength of our data set is that this time period minimizes any selection effects that follow from the Tellabs decision. We are able to observe directly the impact of Tellabs on the motion to dismiss decision without having to take into account any shift in the mix of cases appearing before the court. It, however, precludes us in this study from testing how plaintiffs' attorneys responded to Tellabs in their decision to file suit.
We limit our sample to cases in which an allegation of fraud was made under Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, although we include public offering cases ( § 11 of the Securities Act) and proxy cases ( § 14 of the Exchange Act) if a Rule 10b-5 claim is made as well.
We exclude cases in which financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) are the primary defendant because of the different regulatory regime that applies to them.
[Insert Table 1 About Here]. Table 1 shows that the lawsuit filings were distributed relatively equally across our sample period, although there is some tapering off in 2006. Looking at the frequency of lawsuit by circuit, we find that the Second and Ninth Circuits are clearly head-and-shoulders above their peers with 18% and 27% of the lawsuits. Thus, nearly half of the cases in our sample come from these two circuits, which sit on opposite ends of the scale for pleading scienter.
Looking at suit outcomes, we see that settlement is the most common outcome (47% of the cases), but dismissal with prejudice is not far behind (40%). If dismissal with prejudice is combined with voluntary dismissal, over half of the cases end up being dismissed in some manner. This finding suggests that plaintiffs' lawyers are taking on substantial risk in these cases, although that risk may not be evenly distributed across all cases. Notably, only a trivial percentage of cases are resolved through summary judgment or trial. These findings confirm that the motion to dismiss is the main event for most defendants; if they fail to prevail at this point, settlement is likely. Comparing the Ninth Circuit with the other circuits, we see that settlement is slightly less likely in the Ninth Circuit.
Control Variables
Descriptive statistics regarding the cases are presented in Table 2 . We use the following set of variables in each of our multivariate models as controls (collectively referred as "Case Controls"). From the complaints, we collect information about the causes of action alleged and use indicator variables for the cause of action. 30 All of our cases were selected to include a Rule 10b-5 cause of action (the base category). Eleven percent of the cases also allege a § 11 claim under the Securities Act of 1933 (Section 11). Section 11 is only available for material misstatements and certain omissions in the registration statement used in a public offering, but it allows for substantial easier because it does not require plaintiffs to plead fraudulent intent.
Moreover, loss causation and due diligence are affirmative defenses. Claims under § 14 of the Exchange Act relating to misstatements in a proxy statement also carry an easier standard for state of mind and loss causation (Section 14), but these are found in a much smaller percentage of the sample. Most suits allege solely Rule 10b-5 violations.
[Insert Table 2 About Here].
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Complaints will typically provide detail on the revelation for the fraud that triggered the lawsuit. We include in our Case Controls indicator variables for government investigations (Govt. Investigation) and financial restatements (Restatement), each a high profile adverse event, are the most common events giving rise to these suits. The presence of a government investigation or a financial restatement indicates a higher likelihood of wrongdoing and thus a stronger case for the plaintiffs. The overall strength of the case will also be bolstered if the firm has terminated a top officer (Officer Term.) or its auditor (Auditor Term.) due to events relating to the fraud in question.
We also include variables in our Case Controls relating to the firm-specific characteristics of the defendant issuer. We include a measure of firm size, measured as market value of equity measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period (Market Capitalization We also collect data for our Case Controls relating to the use of confidential witnesses in the complaints in our sample (Confidential). This data is collected from the first complaint after the selection of the lead plaintiff. Since the cases were all selected prior to the Tellabs decision,
we are unable to test the impact of Tellabs on confidential witness use. Nonetheless, this data may offer insights on the quality of the complaints filed in the different circuits. We see that complaints filed in the Ninth Circuit are somewhat less likely to rely on confidential witnesses, but the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p-value=0.134).
For our tests focusing on dismissals based on a lack of scienter, we include a set of variables relating to the allegation of defendant motive in the complaint (referred to as the "Motive Variables"). We collect allegations from the complaint relating to motive for the fraud and the triggering event for its revelation. Because we lack data on the lead plaintiff and selected lead counsel for all our cases, we use these variables only for robustness tests. 
lead counsel (Top Attorney). 32 Attorneys more experienced in class actions may have different selection criteria for the cases that they bring or may have greater resources to bring to bear in investigating fraud and drafting complaints. These differences may affect probability of dismissal. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics relating to the rationale for dismissing the complaint. Scienter, the issue addressed by Tellabs, is far and away the most commonly invoked argument for dismissing complaints, with 40% of dismissals relying at least in part on the failure to adequately allege scienter. The same argument is rejected in nearly a quarter of dismissal decisions.
[Insert Table 3 About Here].
Empirical Testing
Suit Outcome and Tellabs
We begin by assessing the effect of Tellabs on case outcomes, specifically, the likelihood of dismissal. As noted above, scienter is by far the most frequently litigated issue in motions to dismiss, appearing in over 60% of motion to dismiss decisions, so Tellabs certainly has the potential to influence outcomes. On the other hand, the Reasonableness standard adopted by Most of the Case Controls in Table 4 are not significantly different from zero. The coefficient on Restatement is negative and significant in all three models, indicating that a restatement makes it less likely that a case will terminate. Larger firms, as measured by market capitalization, on the other hand, seem to be more successful in obtaining a termination of litigation. The coefficient on ln(market capitalization) is positive and significant at the 1% level in Models 1 and 3.
[ Table 4 about here]
Scienter as Grounds for Dismissal and Tellabs
The regression results presented in Table 4 focused on the overall effect of Tellabs on case outcomes. We now focus on final dismissal decisions based on scienter. In place of the Terminate dependent variable used in the last set of regressions, we instead use an ordered 34 As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 4 . Unreported, neither variable is significant in the models. Moreover, the robustness models generate the same qualitative results as in Table 4. logit model, with the dependent variable "Scienter." Scienter is defined to equal 1 if the final motion to dismiss decision ordered dismissal (at least partially) based on a failure to plead scienter with particularity, 0 if the decision both denied and granted dismissal based on scienter, and -1 if the decision denied dismissal based on scienter. We estimate the same three models in Variables were significant in the models.
[ Table 5 About Here]
As expected, we find that the Ninth Circuit is more likely to dismiss based on scienter grounds than other circuits. Tellabs, however, seems to have diminished the Ninth Circuit's propensity to dismiss. Post-Tellabs is negative and significant at the 5% level in the regression for the Ninth Circuit sub-sample (Model 2), and the interaction variable for the Ninth Circuit and Post-Tellabs is significant in the overall sample (Model 3). Thus, Tellabs appears to have had its most substantial effect reducing the propensity of circuits to dismiss on scienter grounds in circuits previously applying the Preponderance standard, and in particular, the Ninth Circuit. 
Litigation Delay and Tellabs
We now turn to the cost of Tellabs for defendants seeking dismissal. As our proxy for those costs, we assess the effect of Tellabs on the time required for defendants to obtain a dismissal with prejudice.
One important question for litigants is how many "bites at the apple" will be afforded to the plaintiffs. Defendants are anxious to obtain a dismissal with prejudice at the earliest moment to minimize the expense and distraction of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs, however, want to avail themselves of the opportunity to craft a complaint that will pass muster with the district court; earlier opinions dismissing a complaint without prejudice may provide guidance to the
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plaintiffs on what they need to do to craft an adequate complaint. Judges may vary in their willingness to afford plaintiffs that opportunity, and they have fairly substantial discretion in dismissing with or without prejudice, at least after the first dismissal, which will typically be without prejudice.
Tellabs may have sent an important signal to judges with respect to how lenient they should be in affording plaintiffs an opportunity to plead. And for courts that previously adhered to the Preponderance standard, Tellabs announced a more lenient standard that might well require a re-evaluation of the complaint if it had not already been dismissed with prejudice. For courts adhering to the reasonableness standard, Tellabs invites a new inquiry applying its more exacting standard. To test these propositions, we limit our sample to those cases that ended up with a dismissal with prejudice. We use the number of dismissal decisions before a court reaches the final dismissal with prejudice as a proxy for the length of the dismissal decision. For those cases that resulted in a dismissal with prejudice, the number of dismissal decisions ranged from 1 to 4 in our data set. We use an ordered logit model, with the number of decisions required to get to a dismissal with prejudice as our dependent variable.
We estimate three models with the same independent variables (including Case Controls and
Motive Variables) as in the Scienter models in We present our results in Table 6 . The most interesting results are from the regressions examining the Ninth Circuit. The coefficient on Post-Tellabs in the Ninth Circuitonly subset regression (Model 2) is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that it took significantly more dismissal motion decisions to reach the final dismissal with prejudice after Tellabs. In Model 3 (with all the circuits), the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is positive and significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Ninth Circuit x Post-Tellabs is positive and significant at the 5% level. The Ninth Circuit -which appears to be the most willing to grant dismissal even prior to Tellabs -takes considerably longer to do it after the Tellabs decision.
36
The results from Table 6 indicate that the Ninth Circuit's greater willingness to dismiss was apparently tempered, to some extent, by providing plaintiffs with every opportunity to meet the pleading standard. That tendency was only accentuated by Tellabs, with the PostTellabs coefficient strongly significant in the regression for the Ninth Circuit subsample and the interaction variable significant in the overall sample.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
We have found that Tellabs reduced the likelihood of dismissal on scienter grounds in the Ninth Circuit, while at the same time requiring defendants to go through more rounds of 36 As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 6 . Unreported, the robustness models generate the same qualitative results as in Table 6 . motions to dismiss in order to obtain a final dismissal with prejudice. Both of these consequences mean greater litigation costs for defendants, suggesting that defendants should be more willing to pay a settlement in order to rid themselves of even a weak case. Thus, another measure of the overall effect of Tellabs on litigation outcomes is the incidence of nuisance settlement.
In Table 7 , we focus on the sub-sample of class actions that resulted in a settlement.
We use as our dependent variable "Nuisance," which equals 1 if the settlement amount was for $3 million or less and 0 if the settlement amount was for greater than $3 million. Did Tellabs increase the incidence of nuisance settlement? We estimate logit regressions with Nuisance as the dependent variable. We estimate three models with the same the same independent variables (including Case Controls) as in the Terminate models in Table 4 . Nuisance = α + ß 1i Post-Tellabs i + ß 2i Reasonableness i + ß3iReasonableness * Post-Tellabs i + ß 4i Preponderance i + ß 5i Preponderance * Post-Tellabs i + ∑ß ki Case Controls ki + ε i
For the overall sample, we find that the Reasonableness standard correlated positively with nuisance settlements; Tellabs appears to have bolstered defendants in these circuits in refusing to pay nuisance settlements. In Model 1, the coefficient on Reasonableness is positive and significant at the 1% level; the coefficient on Reasonableness x Post-Tellabs is negative significant at the 5% level. At the other end of the spectrum, the coefficient for the Preponderance standard is insignificant, as is the interaction variable with Post-Tellabs, suggesting that Tellabs had little effect on nuisance settlement in those circuits. When we isolate the Ninth Circuit in Model 2, we see no effect of Tellabs within the circuit standing alone. The coefficient on Post-Tellabs is not significantly different from zero. In Model 3, we observe that the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is negative and significant at the 5% levelindicating that prior to Tellabs, the Ninth Circuit had significantly lower probability of a nuisance suit outcome relative to the other circuits. In contrast, we find a positive coefficient (significant at the 5% level) on the interaction variable between the Ninth Circuit and Post-Tellabs. This suggests that Tellabs increased the likelihood of nuisance settlement in the Ninth Circuit. With dismissal less likely in the Ninth Circuit after Tellabs, defendants appear to have become more willing to settle weak cases for low value settlement amounts. 
Tellabs and Dura
One potentially confounding effect on our analysis of the impact of Tellabs on lower court decisionmaking is another Supreme Court decision affecting motions to dismiss, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo. 38 Dura had a fairly typical profile for a securities fraud class action: pharmaceutical company announces declining sales and the FDA's rejection of a new product, stock price falls, lawsuit ensues. What was unusual about Dura's fact pattern was the sequence of these events. The stock price fall came in response to the announcement of the decline in sales, while the FDA's failure to approve the new product came eight months later.
37 As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 7 . Unreported, the robustness models generate the same qualitative results as in Table 7 . We also re-estimate the models in Table 7 with a different cutoff for nuisance suits--treating settlements for $4 million or less as a nuisance settlement. Unreported, models generated similar results as in Table 7 except that the coefficient on Reasonableness x Post-Tellabs in Model 1 is significant at only the 10% level. The coefficient on Ninth Circuit in Model 3 is only significant at the 14.7% level and the coefficient on Ninth Circuit x Post-Tellabs is significant at the 16.6% level, beyond the limits of conventional significance. 38 544 U. S. 336 (2005) .
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This latter announcement was met by a drop in the stock price, but the price quickly rebounded. Given the rebound in the stock price shortly after the FDA announcement, the PSLRA's damages cap would likely have precluded the recovery of any damages if they were measured from by the reaction to that announcement. 39 Thus, framing the class period to end with the announcement of the sales decline provided the maximum available value line, even though it meant a somewhat shorter class period to apply that value line to. Moreover, the FDA rejection gave the plaintiffs' lawyers another set of misstatements with which to satisfy the requisite Rule 10b-5 elements, in particular scienter and materiality.
In most circuits, the Dura plaintiffs' lawyers' stratagem would have been easily rebuffed by the court, as the majority view required some connection between the alleged misstatement and the economic loss claimed. 40 The district court in Dura agreed, dismissing the allegation relating to the FDA rejection for failure to plead loss causation. Importantly, the district court also rejected the allegations relating to the sales decline for failure to adequately plead scienter. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the dismissal of the FDA allegations, holding that the plaintiff's loss only need "touch" the misstatement (Touch Causation), and that this requirement could be satisfied by alleging that the price was inflated by the misrepresentation at the time of purchase.
41
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous, opinion, rejected the Ninth Circuit's touch causation standard as inconsistent with the PSLRA's requirement that the plaintiff show that Circuit. The coefficient on Post-Dura in Model 2 (Ninth Circuit only) is positive and significant at the 5% level. In Model 3, the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is negative and significant at the 5% level while the Ninth Circuit x Post-Dura interaction term is positive and significant at the 5% level. Thus, we conclude that Dura's primary impact was on pleading practices in the Ninth Circuit.
44
[Insert Table 8 About Here].
Conclusion
This study examines the impact of the Supreme Court's first decision interpreting the "strong inference" pleading standard of the PSLRA. In Tellabs, the Supreme Court rejected the Seventh Circuit's "reasonableness" standard for drawing inferences of fraudulent intent from a Supreme Court and Securities Class Actions complaint. The Seventh Circuit standard was consistent with longstanding practice in the federal courts, but difficult to square with the language adopted by Congress in the PSLRA.
Consequently, the reasonableness standard was a distinct outlier among the circuit courts, and the Supreme Court's reversal of it had little impact.
Substantially more important was the Tellabs Court's rejection of the "preponderance" standard followed in the First, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits. We find that circuits that employed a preponderance standard prior to Tellabs, particularly the Ninth Circuit, are less likely to dismiss on scienter grounds after that decision. We also find that Tellabs correlates with an overall lower likelihood of dismissal in the Ninth Circuit. The result of this reduction in the standards for pleading fraud in the Ninth Circuit means that defendants are more willing to pay a nuisance settlement post-Tellabs. These findings suggest that Tellabs may have been, on balance, a victory for the plaintiffs' bar, despite its reversal of a pro-plaintiff decision in the lower court.
26 t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordered Logit Model: Dependent variable "Scienter" is defined to equal 1 if the final motion to dismiss decision ordered dismissal (at least partially) based on a failure to plead scienter with particularity, 0 if the decision either did not rule on dismissal based on scienter or both denied and granted dismissal based on scienter, and -1 if the decision denied dismissal based on scienter. Case Controls include Section 11, Section 14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor Term., ln(Market Capitalization), High Tech, FDA, Confidential, and Top Atty. Variable definitions are in the Appendix. 
